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ABSTRACT
Afghanistan has come to be seen as emblematic of the security
threats besetting peace and security operations, and in this article
we consider the response to such threats via the ‘bunkering’ of
international staﬀ. Drawing on an in-depth qualitative survey with
aid and peacebuilding oﬃcials in Kabul, we illustrate how
seemingly mundane risk management procedures have negative
consequences for intervening institutions; for the relation
between interveners and national actors; and for the purpose of
intervention itself. Bunkering, we argue, is deeply political –
‘imprisoning’ staﬀ behind ramparts while generating an illusion of







One day in August 2015, an employee of a large development agency was driving through
a middle-class residential area in Kabul. Meters away from her oﬃce armed men stopped
the car and dragged her out of the vehicle. The woman was released by the kidnappers
two months later but the institutional implications of this incident were far-reaching.
Until that day the organization’s many employees lived in private houses across the city
and were allowed to go to ‘whitelisted’ places. Now, in response to the kidnapping,
almost all foreign staﬀ were relocated away from Afghanistan. Eventually, a smaller
number returned to Kabul, but they did not return to their old houses and lives. They
had one hour to pack their things while an armored car was waiting for them. From
that point on they were housed in one of the organization’s major oﬃce compounds.
They lived and worked in the same space and were only allowed a few ‘social movements’
per week, restricted to embassies. Everyone had to be home in the evening and move-
ments in the city were restricted to armored cars.
This incident is emblematic of the central concern of this article: the politics of the ‘bun-
kered’, high-security forms of intervention under way in many conﬂict zones today, from
South Sudan (Duﬃeld 2010) to Mali (Andersson 2016), and from Syria to Iraq and even
Haiti (Lemay-Hébert 2018). Building on insights from such settings, we will here use Afgha-
nistan as an illustrative case study of the larger challenges of bringing stability and aid into
fragile contexts of high and uncertain security risk.
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Much has been written about the broader rationales and conﬂicting agendas pertaining
to crisis intervention and peace operations, and Afghanistan is certainly no exception. Yet
while counterterrorism, peacebuilding, statebuilding and stability are fertile topics for aca-
demic and policy debate, the mundane and material aspects of how interventions are
organized in practice are only rarely brought into the wider conversation. In this article,
then, we aim to contribute to an incipient debate on the political dimensions of such prac-
tices in peace and aid operations. In particular, we will build on the ﬁne-grained sociologi-
cal approach of Erving Goﬀman, drawing analytical parallels between his notion of a ‘total
institution’ and today’s bunkered interventions.
Pioneering scholarship on everyday aspects of international intervention has served to
highlight the frequent gap between objectives and practices, often by recourse to an eth-
nographic approach. Apthorpe (2011) has explored the ‘separate world’ of international
aid workers through the notion of ‘Aidland’ – further adapted by Autesserre (2014) as
‘Peaceland’, or the community of practitioners engaged in peace interventions. Other
authors – notably Duﬃeld (2010) and Smirl (2015) – have put focus on the material and
infrastructural dimensions of peace and humanitarian interventions, as has Fast (2014)
in her critique of the predominant security-based responses to dealing with danger in
humanitarian aid. In a similar vein, Bliesemann de Guevara (2017) has illustrated the per-
formative character of interveners’ practices, such as skirting security protocols, while
Kühn (2016) has shown how the smallest material objects – souvenirs bought by inter-
national interveners in conﬂict zones – may shape key audiences’ imaginaries back
home, ‘orientalizing’ conﬂict zones.
Starting from everyday realities, all these authors emphasize how smaller scale social
and material realities help give speciﬁc shape to interventions, often generating larger pro-
blems. More speciﬁcally, the security infrastructures discussed by, for example, Duﬃeld
and Fast are often judged to increase distance to the society that is being intervened
upon, as our own earlier work has also shown (Andersson and Weigand 2015).
Building on this literature, our article takes further steps towards considering the poli-
tics of everyday, material dimensions of aid and peace interventions by exploring one of
the biggest constraints on eﬀective civilian engagement with Afghan society at a time of
selective military drawdown: the security-related obstacles to getting anything done at all.
What are the rationales and consequences of increasing ‘bunkerization’ (Duﬃeld 2012) of
international interveners’ operations and staﬀ in response to the threat of violent attacks?
How do international civilian workers, posited at the interface between donor govern-
ments, their organizations, and local society, reﬂect on security risk and protection
measures – and what lessons can be drawn from these practitioners’ inside views for
larger debates on international crisis interventions?
Before proceeding to answer these questions, a brief note on our methods is in order.
Our in-depth qualitative survey with international workers in Afghanistan, conducted in
2016, sought to gain a broad understanding of how aid workers responded to security
issues, which was in turn triangulated with follow-up interviews as well as with 18
months of ﬁeldwork in the country in 2014/15 (Weigand 2017). Almost all our survey
respondents were based in Kabul; unsurprisingly so, given the heavy skew of the inter-
national presence towards the capital in recent years. Indeed, large oﬃcial development
and UN agencies increasingly run projects outside the capital via ‘remote management’
of subsidiaries, partner organizations and local staﬀ (Blankenship 2014). In this strategically
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situated ‘island’ within what Duﬃeld (2010) has called the ‘archipelago’ of bunkerized
intervention, everyday security practices take on important political dimensions relevant
to international engagement in the country as a whole, and indeed to international
peace and crisis interventions writ large.
As regards our argument, we are not principally concerned with the ‘eﬃcacy’ of inter-
national intervention, but rather with its politics and perception. Based on our triangulated
survey responses, we argue that bunkerization and ‘hard’ security risk management
reinforce certain power relationships within organizations as well as at their interface
with key external actors – that is, it generates a security environment which may, in
turn, have a deeper psychological as well as a broader sociopolitical impact, as we
suggest in our conclusion.
Hard security risk management (SRM), which is based on the idea of providing security
though measures such as walls, guards and armored vehicles, involves temporal dimen-
sions (curfews, rest, and recuperation, or ‘R&R’); transport rules; ‘security advice’; and
speciﬁc social arrangements (separation of foreigners and locals, and of workplace and
leisure time). Given this multidimensional nature of hard SRM, we have chosen to
approach the ‘bunker politics’ of Afghanistan through the sociological idiom of
Goﬀman’s total institution. In Goﬀman’s deﬁnition, a total institution is ‘a place of resi-
dence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals cut oﬀ from the
wider society for an appreciable period of time together lead an enclosed formally admi-
nistered round of life’ (Goﬀman 1961, xxi). Prisons, convents, mental asylums and the
armed forces are all examples of such total institutions, and they all have in common a
breaking down of the usual barriers between diﬀerent spheres of life (intimate, social, pro-
fessional spaces) as well as a barrier between their self-contained worlds and the outside.
‘Their encompassing or total character’, Goﬀman (1961, 4) writes, ‘is symbolized by the
barrier to social intercourse with the outside and to departure that is often built right
into the physical plant, such as locked doors, high walls, barbed wire’. In such institutions,
a great degree of control is exerted over the institutionalized population with the aim of re-
socializing them in one way or another –whether as ‘docile bodies’ in a Foucauldian sense,
or for a speciﬁc purpose such as religious self-discipline (in convents) or war-ﬁghting (in
the forces).
Is total institution, we may ask, even a useful term for analyzing the rather exclusive
social world of international intervention? With some caveats, we believe this to be the
case: indeed, our survey respondents themselves talked about how ‘hard security’ trans-
formed their daily lives into something akin to an institutionalized or even carceral experi-
ence. In ‘institutionalized intervention’, international workers ﬁnd themselves severely
constrained in how they operate and engage with local society while seeing their own
mobility and control over everyday working and living conditions drastically reduced.
From an insiders’ viewpoint, then, bunkering is political in an everyday sense that may
generate counterintuitive consequences – especially, as we shall see, as insiders called
the eﬃcacy of hard SRM into question by noting its inconsistencies and frequent non-hol-
istic implementation. While exploring this ‘infrapolitics’ (Scott 1990) of institutionalization
in Kabul from an insider perspective, our article also ‘peeks over the bunker walls’ to ask,
from an external viewpoint, whether the bunkered life of interveners does not also tell us
something about the wider geopolitics of intervention. With a view to further comparative
studies, we suggest in our conclusion that bunkerization presages a token international
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engagement of a lopsided kind that only manages to maintain an illusion of presence at
great diﬃculty and expense – and with severe impacts on the relationship between inter-
vener and intervened-upon populations.
Security scares and panic rooms: A preamble on the ‘Kabubble’
Before considering our empirical material in some detail, this section gives a brief overview
of the growing bunkerization in Kabul in the past decade, and of the wider trend towards
hard security. Among aid practitioners, hard SRM has long been the subject of extensive
debate (e.g. Egeland, Harmer, and Stoddard 2011; Jackson and Zyck 2017; van Brabant
2000), while academic studies have emphasized one of its most problematic aspects, the
growing global market in hard security provision (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Avant
2005; Krahmann 2010; O’Reilly 2010; Singer 2003). Many civilian workers and organizations
exhibit signiﬁcant ambivalence towards hard SRM, inﬂuenced by acceptance-based strat-
egies from earlier decades – something we will see reﬂected in survey responses.
The landscape of international intervention in conﬂict-torn regions is increasingly struc-
tured via complex forms of risk management. For UN agencies, missions and NGOs alike,
risk management is part of a duty of care towards employees, while at the same time fulﬁll-
ing the stringent demands of insurers and assuaging fears ‘back home’ that expatriate citi-
zens may be targeted. Yet the local consequences may be severe, as hard SRM entails
transferring risk onto often ill-prepared frontline staﬀ (Andersson and Weigand 2015).
As we will argue throughout this article, it may also help shift power relations within inter-
vening organizations and between these and the wider social and political world in which
they operate, with signiﬁcant consequences for the outcomes of intervention. One of
these consequences concerns a growing distance to the intervened-upon society (Anders-
son and Weigand 2015; Bliesemann de Guevara 2016; Duﬃeld 2012), as the Afghan
example shows.
It is worth recalling that, following the 2001 invasion, the security regime of aid
agencies in Kabul was rather diﬀerent to what it is today. ‘Expatriates’ mingled at restau-
rant pools or simply walked to the frequent house parties in Kabul’s middle-class neigh-
borhood, Taimani. Their vibrant lifestyle even served as a template for a French TV
series (Kaboul Kitchen) and a Hollywood movie (Whiskey Tango Foxtrot). But in the late
2000s, following a surge in attacks, the security restrictions of most aid agencies were tigh-
tened. ‘Hard’ security became the norm. Most foreigners today live in compounds, hidden
behind high walls, driven around in armored cars and protected by armed guards. Bunker-
ization has come to deﬁne the erstwhile ‘Kabubble’, as the self-enclosed social world of
expatriates was already known in more joyful times.
Afghanistan today certainly is not a safe place to be. Since our survey, conducted in
early 2016, security has deteriorated further. 29,867 security incidents were recorded in
Afghanistan in 2017 alone (INSO 2018), killing or injuring more than 10,000 civilians
(UNAMA 2018). In Kabul, suicide attacks and car bombs frequently shake the city, while
assassinations and kidnaps are rampant. Major attacks have further targeted civilians.
Most prominently, an explosion close to the highly fortiﬁed German Embassy in Kabul
in May 2017 killed more than 90 people (Rasmussen 2017).
Aid workers have also been killed or injured in the past years, and have even been
deliberately targeted. For instance, gunmen attacked the guesthouse of a Swedish NGO
4 F. WEIGAND AND R. ANDERSSON
in Kabul in May 2017. Local aid workers, in keeping with the wider trend, are most fre-
quently in the ﬁring line: Humanitarian Outcomes (2017) describes Afghanistan as the
second most dangerous place for aid workers after Syria.
In this context, hard security can sometimes provide some necessary protection: to
state the obvious, sitting in an armored car may be life-saving when close to an explosion.
But as we will insist, security measures are much more than a technical exercise. With this
in mind, in the rest of this article, we provide not so much an ‘external’ reading of security
dynamics in Afghanistan, but rather wish to direct attention to the inside and investigate
how international interveners themselves perceive their security – as well as the politics of
their bunkered predicament. Our next section will consider our empirical ﬁndings at
length, before drawing out some larger analytical implications, building on the notion
of an ‘institutionalization’ of life in intervention.
Survey ﬁndings: Bunker politics and staﬀ control
As we move onto our survey, we must emphasize that this research is qualitative. Our
survey of international aid workers’ perception of their security and of SRM, conducted
via an online form shared via our ﬁeld networks, was not randomized, and so is not stat-
istically representative. The sample size is small (n = 64), with some response bias poten-
tially present. However, we have used the survey format principally to ask qualitative
questions, with a focus on in-depth free-text responses, while triangulating with our pre-
vious comparative research on security management; with our long-term ﬁeld research
in Afghanistan prior to the survey (see Weigand 2017); and with follow-up interviews.
The survey responses match the observations made during our ﬁeld research, while
also providing us with a wider range of insights into how diﬀerent organizations
manage security risks and how this is perceived by staﬀ. Indeed, in a context where
ﬁeld research itself is becoming increasingly diﬃcult due to insecurity and to the
severe restrictions on independent research in the context of ‘hard security’, we need
to explore alternatives to standard ﬁeldwork models (Robben 2010). In other words,
our choice of method in this instance should be read as part of a wider risk dilemma
shared among academics and practitioners at work on the margins of the ‘danger
zone’ (Andersson 2016).
Several of our respondents (at least 10 out of 64)1 worked for a major European govern-
ment agency, which we will call ‘GovAg’ below. Our survey was conducted at a particular
time, in February and March 2016, at a time when attacks were escalating even in Kabul –
and soon after GovAg, along with other agencies, had decided to ‘bunker up’. Hence, the
responses below (and particularly those from GovAg) provide a qualitative case study of
how ‘hard security’ is imposed, and with what consequences, at a time of increasing
panic over the presence of international staﬀ in Afghanistan. Later, after our survey,
GovAg workers were moved to an even more fortiﬁed compound at the outskirts of
Kabul, the ‘Green Village’, where many aid operations are based at the time of writing
(2018), and from where almost no local movement was possible. In other words, our
research was situated at a particularly productive moment of change, or in a particular
‘social situation’ (Goﬀman 1961), in which security dilemmas were coming to the fore
in interveners’ personal experience – oﬀering an intriguing window into everyday
reality inside the international ‘bunker’.
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Security measures: Initial survey assessment
Taking the aggregate results of our survey at face value, respondents do not seem overly
concerned with insecurity and security measures. Asked ‘how safe they usually feel’, the
vast majority of respondents (58 out of 64) gave a value of 3 or 4 to their sense of security
on a scale ranging from 1 = very unsafe to 5 = very safe. Asked about how eﬀectively their
organization’s risk management procedures helped address security concerns, somewhat
more diverse responses were oﬀered: 17 per cent (11 respondents) answered ‘very ineﬀec-
tively’ (a value of 1), while half (32 out of 64) gave a value of 3; only 3 respondents
answered ‘very eﬀectively’ (Figure 1). Similar answers – tilting towards a stronger sense
of safety –were given when we asked more speciﬁcally about security measures at accom-
modation and at the place of work.
So far, so unsurprising: international workers stationed in Kabul (where all but 5 of the
respondents were based; the rest were in other cities in Afghanistan) are well-prepared to
cope with insecurity, as one of us saw ﬁrst-hand during ﬁeld research. What is interesting,
however, is how these answers contrasted with the free-text responses many oﬀered to
more speciﬁc questions. In sometimes considerable detail, they were highly critical of
security measures as regards their inconsistencies, their side-eﬀects, and the power
relations that they helped create.
Out of our 64 respondents, 22 wrote to our optional question on whether they would
like to add anything regarding security measures. Out of these, 17 were negative about
hard security; 3 were even-handed or wanted more hard security; and 2 were positive
about their security measures, which in both cases were of the ‘softest’ (low-proﬁle)
kind, which still existed at the time.
As an independent person who lives in a lower middle class area in a small apartment
block and walks and uses shared taxis, I feel much safer than internationals who live in
compounds and whose movements are controlled by security contractors, said one of
these positive respondents. The other said:
Figure 1. How eﬀectively do your employer’s risk management procedures help to address your
concerns?
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As an employee of a local NGO, there were very few threats that would have been directly
targeted at me. Kidnapping (mostly for ﬁnancial reasons) is the only main fear. Therefore,
the NGO’s security strategy (essentially, not to have a security strategy) was ﬁne for most
of the time. The absence of hard security meant I didn’t attract much attention, and could
maintain a relatively high quality of life.
The negative responses to hard security, by contrast, ranged from subtle to scathing.
Echoing research ﬁndings (Collinson 2013; Fast 2014; Weigand’s ﬁeldwork conversations),
many respondents noted how hard security ‘raised proﬁle’ and changes perceptions of a
locality, and so potentially created further risks, whether of a security type or in terms of
work eﬀectiveness (programmatic or ﬁnancial risk). One respondent said:
I feel that instead of producing [a] realistic risk assessment, international organizations tend to
generate alarms and impose extremely strict security restrictions in order to not encounter any
risk. This alters signiﬁcantly the perception of the local environment of their employees,
aﬀecting signiﬁcantly also the quality of their work.
Another said:
Security measures are always too conservative. If you don’t allow your employees to go any-
where, you do reduce the risk of them being at the wrong place at the wrong time but you
also prevent them from doing their job […] It is a diﬃcult balance to ﬁnd.
While hard security increased organizational risks in some respondents’ views, many
argued that it also contributed to further insecurity. One consultant said:
I think that some security measures were more targeted at one threat, but then made another
threat greater. For example – we used to drive in small Toyotas like the locals. That was great
for blending in, in public. But [it] was more dangerous in case of IEDs.
While becoming a conspicuous target was mentioned by many respondents as one of the
biggest drawbacks of hard security, another was the risk of untrustworthy security provi-
ders. One government agency worker said:
The harder the security, the more attention it draws, thus the less secure it can make you feel.
The more people are in one place, again, the more likely the target is perceived as ‘juicy’, thus
again more security brings with it the sense of insecurity.
In the view of a GovAg manager, high-proﬁle security did not increase security ‘especially
due to the fact that we have national armed guards on the compound, who could be
threatened or paid outside to attack us within the compound’.
This respondent was among those seeing their organization’s security work as ‘very
ineﬀective’. However, signiﬁcantly, several of those who gave a more balanced answer
of 3 to that question were also critical. One such respondent, a UN oﬃcial, said, ‘Security
measures taken by [UN agency] are meant to serve as a deterrent, but frequently end up
attracting a high level of unwanted attention.’ In other words, respondents did not so
much object to security provisions per se, but to their piecemeal and often counterproduc-
tive implementation – oﬀering a subtler understanding of security than that propagated
by their own security management.
In order to get some work done in this restrictive environment, several respondents said
stretching security rules was of the essence. Forty-nine out of 64 respondents (77 per cent)
reported that their organizations restricted their staﬀ’s movements for security reasons,
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but 19 of them stated that they never or only sometimes followed these security rules. One
said, ‘Security intelligence is so random and bad – it seems pointless.’ One UN oﬃcial
stated, ‘the security regulations are based on a very unlikely worst-case scenario, which
hampers the work that we do. If I were to follow all the rules, it would make interviews
and networking virtually impossible’. Another UN agency worker responded,
The security measures create an attractive veneer of security but would do little if we were
directly targeted. If anything it makes us more conspicuous and less eﬀective (diverting
funds, alienating locals, etc.). Our management ﬂouts certain rules to enable us to deliver
on project goals but are forced to report in a speciﬁc way to headquarters.
In other words, some answers betrayed clear frustration with SRM both due to contra-
dictions in implementation and to knock-on eﬀects on daily work. Twenty-two respon-
dents (34 per cent) described the security updates for staﬀ provided by their
organization as ‘useless’. As one humanitarian oﬃcial with a UN agency, who gave a
balanced answer of 3 to the eﬀectiveness of security at their organization, complained:
The security approach of the organization only serves to isolate us and makes us more vulner-
able. How many times have we heard that everyone is on lockdown because there is a threat
against a UN compound? Can someone explain that one to me please.
More than being simply a subtle critique of the technical failings of hard SRM, the angry
tone in such responses further hinted at the psychological and political implications of
hard SRM, to which we will keep returning below.
‘Advice’ versus lockdown: Politics of security
Once we asked respondents more intricate questions about the everyday experience of
navigating security, the criticism became stronger, and more personal. To our open
optional question on whether respondents followed their organization’s security advice
(‘why do or don’t you follow the advice?’), 38 gave free-text answers, of which we
classiﬁed 3 as positive about SRM; 21 as largely balanced (mainly abiding by the rationale
behind SRM, even though critical points were made on its relevance); while we classed 14
as negative overall about SRM, not just about speciﬁc instances of advice. Interestingly,
while 7 of those gave a value of either 1 or 2 to the eﬀectiveness of their organizations’
security procedures, 7 had rated these more positively, at 3 or 4. As one senior-level con-
tractor in development wrote, ‘If you follow all the advice, you’ll go crazy simply because
you won’t be able to leave your residence.’ Conﬁrming observations made during ﬁeld
research, others did not even have that option. One GovAg respondent said: ‘There is
no other choice, as we are locked into our compound. We can for sure try to avoid it
through oﬃcial fake invitations, but this is also limited to very rare activities.’ Another
worker was scathing, in a comment of increasing relevance in the post-2016 environment:
We used to not follow [the advice] very much but then they locked us up in a compound and
there’s literally no choice whether to break the rules or not anymore […] Locking your kids up
is easier than looking out for them.
A growing disconnection from, and discontentment with, the employer thanks to the
way hard security was imposed was thus in evidence, with responses emphasizing a
sense of involuntary submission to arbitrary rules. A growing sense of employer-employee
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disconnect was also evident in critical notes on the business side of security. As one NGO
aid manager said: ‘Security is a well-paid business that often heightens the risk and makes
participants in the protocol a target.’
Amid the criticism and frustration, it was clear some workers saw SRM as, at best, a tick-
box exercise covering the backs of those higher up the chain. As one mid-level UN agency
oﬃcial said:
It can be badly informed (UN security is somewhat of a joke), insensitive to the natural ﬂuctu-
ations in security, often draconian to cover the hides of security oﬃcers and thus adheres to
rules for the sake of rules (rather than actual eﬀectiveness), and paranoid.
More speﬁcically, many respondents highlighted the power relations inherent in the
imposition of ‘harder’ security. As concerns the psychology of this ‘bunker politics’ –
the second strand of our argument – the sense of being ‘locked up’; of being treated
as ‘kids’; and of not having any choice was aﬀecting workers’ sense of self-esteem and
self-control, with potentially very negative consequences for their morale and wellbeing.
Insecurity aﬀected mental wellbeing for all but one of our respondents, with half of
them saying it did so ‘quite a lot’ or ‘a lot’. While the risk of becoming a target was a
major worry, the security measures further sharpened the sense of claustrophobia,
tension, and fear. As one respondent said, drawing out a larger comparison to similar
risk management procedures in other crisis zones: ‘Afghanistan and South Sudan left
me burned out, constantly on the edge of a ﬁght or tears, drinking too much, etc. It’s
not the insecurity itself, it’s the crushing measures put in place as a reaction to insecurity.’
Asked optionally about how their employer dealt with risk and insecurity, 38 respon-
dents gave free-text answers, of which we classiﬁed 19 as clearly negative; 8 relatively
balanced even while including critique; and 11 as positive. Some of the positives were
from those managing security or operations for their organization (‘I am the lead and
we take a very immersed Afghan strategy’); from those managing their own security as
independents (‘I’m free to travel on my own will to wherever I desire’); from those
working in small organizations where they knew the security oﬃcial well (‘he is trying
to do what he think is the best’); or from those working at organizations with low-
proﬁle security (‘Generally dealt with very well, more based on negotiation than rules
or physical measures’).
Among the clearly negative responses, these mainly – but not only – concerned hard
security, and a range of scathing adjectives were oﬀered on these: security measures
were variously described as very bad, ‘not analytically engaged and a blanket policy’,
‘irrational and inappropriate’, arbitrary, inconsistent, ‘doing more harm than good’,
‘unhealthy’, ‘knee-jerk’, and ‘amateur’. As one respondent working for an international
agency said, it was ‘a largely useless approach, fueled by Field Safety staﬀ consisting
largely of ex-military personnel’. Negative descriptions were also oﬀered by the eight
respondents giving a more balanced (‘neutral’) answer, saying security may ‘in general’
be handled well but in emergencies information was ‘poorly handled’ and procedures
inadequate. As one consultant said:
Honestly, it’s rubbish. They don’t have a speciﬁc person in charge, just one of the other
researchers/managers who is suddenly made a ‘security advisor’. A guy who has never
been in a similar context, has no experience in that regard and who loves to dress like an
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American contractor. Doesn’t really make me feel much safer that he’s deciding where I can
and cannot go…
Another respondent said: ‘They’re mostly just trying to be able to prove they did every-
thing they could so that if something happens nobody can sue.’
In other words, inconsistency and lack of professionalism added to a sense of insecurity.
Interestingly, however, this sentiment was shared with respondents working for organiz-
ations providing next to no security. One such respondent said, ‘There is no security
policy in place and we are not insured, which makes me feel quite uncomfortable.’ On
hard security, one respondent expressed a similar discomfort:
The organization does not really have a concept, from my point of view. On the one hand,
we’re operating at a high proﬁle, with armored cars etc., on the other hand, we still have
only national armed guards. Altogether, very inconsequent.
In both cases – the over-production of hard security, or the absence of measures – a
growing sense of disconnect from the employer was again in evidence, with not
enough consideration given to a need for holistic security measures that took account
of employees’ skills, views, and wellbeing.
Security at home: Zones of danger and safety
Asked, optionally, ‘how insecurity and security measures aﬀect you at your accommo-
dation and tell us what you think about it’, more detail was forthcoming about the
sense of enclosure among those who experienced hard security. Some 11 respondents
gave negative answers in free text, and all but 1 of these concerned hard security. By con-
trast, among the positive 11 responses almost all concerned low-proﬁle security (as one
international worker for a local NGO said, ‘Having local families next door contributes
to the low-proﬁle nature of the house. In the context of Afghan culture, it makes it feel
like we are under the protection of local ‘hosts’ who care for our safety.’).
Among those giving negative responses to this question, the sense of personal, pro-
fessional and cultural enclosure was prevalent: as one worker for GovAg said,
We’re not allowed to leave our compound, only for oﬃcial work-related meetings. We have to
wear our [GovAg] card all the time and there are cameras everywhere at the compound. Fur-
thermore, we cannot choose with whomwe want to share our accommodation, so therefore it
has a big impact on our daily living.
Amid the sense of enclosure, some respondents voiced a growing suspicion of local
society, and in particular of Afghan guards. One UN agency worker argued that,
While there is an ANP [Afghan National Police] checkpoint within sight of our front door,
our organization believes that should we be targeted by a well-organized group (e.g.
Taliban) they would conveniently be missing at the time of a raid. Thus this checkpoint
may help prevent small crime, but ultimately would not assist [in] the prevention of a
larger organized attack.
The one element of hard SRM that received clear positive comments was the ‘safe
room’ and its infrastructure, compared favorably to the presence of guards: in the
words of one respondent, ‘The safe room and multiple means of communication
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provide the greatest sense of security. Relying on guards, on the other hand, makes me
slightly uncomfortable.’ Another oﬀered:
We have one local unarmed guard and I’m not too convinced of his capabilities, which made
me feel a bit unsafe. After a shooting in front of our gate, I convinced my housemates we
needed a safe room which made me feel a lot better.
While such infrastructure was appreciated, it thus did not outweigh the additional risks
of proﬁle-raising stemming, among other things, from relocation to more prominent sites
as part of a move to a compound; harder security measures at such compounds; and
armed local guards. One mid-level worker for an international organization said:
We were moved from private houses to a compound recently and ever since I feel not safe
anymore at all. That is mostly due to the location, as it is in a high-proﬁle neighborhood.
Before, I felt safer because no one would carry out a complex attack to get 5 foreigners.
But now there’s many of us and it might just be worth it. And if that happens, the safe
room is so far away from the bedrooms, it could just as well be in China.
Another said, echoing conclusions to our last section:
Security measures put in place are schizophrenic. While they are based on a hard security
approach they often do not interlink at all with other eﬀorts at ‘securing’ a location, [includ-
ing] considerations about the location of the compound, soft security-type engagement with
locals and the neighborhood, etc.
In short, many workers thus had a sense that hard security was not only inconsistent but
that in its lack of a holistic approach it generated new dangers. Further, the resulting secur-
ity environment was negatively evaluated in terms of how it distributed power, exacer-
bated psychological impacts, and restructured relations with local society – a key point
of the next section.
Security at work: Relationships under threat
At work, there was a similar story of growing frustration with SRM. Asked about how ‘inse-
curity and security measures aﬀect your daily work and what you think about it’, again an
optional free-text question, 23 respondents said it aﬀected them negatively; 5 gave a more
balanced answer; and only 3 said it had no or little eﬀect (and two of these were working in
low-proﬁle organizations). Security screenings; lockdowns; compound-based work; rules
on transport (especially on the use of armored vehicles) all added to a sense of stress
and frustration. In fact, as we asked respondents on their modes of transport, we had
failed to consider that some were so restricted they did not move outside their compound
at all: as one UN respondent pointed out,
I walk to my oﬃce, ‘cause it is in the same building. My organization would never allow me to
walk [elsewhere], though I would feel relatively safe doing so and I have done so in the past –
not working for the UN.
Especially at workplaces, responses indicated how hard SRM impacted on relations with
local beneﬁciaries, Afghan staﬀ and national counterparts, as well as on relations with other
international interveners. As one respondent said, ‘Our Risk Management often announces
White City or RDM [periods of restricted or nomovement], therefore local staﬀ is not allowed
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to report to work and we have to cancel a lot of meetings.’ Travel outside Kabul to overlook
and visit their aid projects was usually out of the question. One junior international NGO
worker was frustrated: ‘No ability to go to the ﬁeld and monitor my projects. No ability to
go to the ﬁeld and help coordinate all emergency projects among multiple NGOs. Lock-
downs can prevent us from attending important meetings.’ A worker at GovAg said:
Work is mostly done only from the oﬃce, ﬁeld trips are very rare and need special approval.
The exchange and contact between international and national colleagues hardly takes place
(especially as a woman) due to several restrictions that limit the exchange after work hours.
According to another GovAg worker,
There’s no real working with Afghan ministries anymore. We cannot go out and we cannot
invite them into the compound either. A lot of our staﬀ are now working from outside Afgha-
nistan, which makes things more complicated, too. We need to travel between Afghanistan
and [our home country] all the time, which makes working hours very ineﬃcient.
One UN agency worker said:
In an organization geared at providing humanitarian relief for local populations, it seems
incredible that contact with the population frequently is impossible as a result of imposed
security measures (esp. ﬁeld visits – rare and few between, rather than presenting the basis
for our work).
Another international NGO worker said: ‘This aﬀects travel, when we are on lockdown. It
also [aﬀects] the relationship building element of work. There is deﬁnitely a feeling of the
us/them mentality […] It is almost built into the system.’
Disconnect to local society was growing for those experiencing hard security, making
work more diﬃcult and adding to the lack of trust and understanding of the situation.
One respondent, a senior UN agency manager, said:
We live and work on the same compound, with very little opportunity to go outside. Our inter-
actions with locals are limited to work hours with national colleagues. But we are not allowed
to visit them in their homes or have them over for dinner at ours for what is described as secur-
ity reasons. We can’t go shopping or eat in a restaurant. We live in a fear-driven bubble.
The sense of disconnect generated, for many respondents, a deeper divide to local
society. By implication, we see in the responses a certain shared sense of both locals
and employees becoming disconnected in tandem from the powerful actors (whether pol-
itical ones, or decision-makers in their organizations) deﬁning the nature and form of inter-
vention. One respondent summarized this dual predicament of locals and workers in this
way: ‘No freedom; constant discussion of insecurity, including with local staﬀ and patients
who are far more aﬀected.’ An embassy worker noted: ‘Biggest impact is the inability to go
anywhere without an armed escort or [to] meet local people.’
Mental stress
‘No freedom, no privacy’, as one respondent summed it up: the sense of being controlled
and disempowered was frequent, feeding into the general sense of unease and worry.
Again we note how working conditions under hard security – locked into compounds,
with little leisure time, restricted leisure activities and little contact with local life – took
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its mental toll. This was in addition to the risk of attacks itself, which was also experienced
acutely by some of those in low-proﬁle settings. Besides fear driven by attacks and the
reporting of attacks via social and mainstream media, mentioned by respondents, hard
security could worsen the situation considerably. As one international worker for a local
NGO said: ‘Constant underlying stress, combined with [a] 6-day work week and little
time oﬀ make for frequent exhaustion and occasional emotional breakdowns.’ Another
said:
Insecurity simply adds to the stress already imminent in the nature of the work we do.
However, as more security measures are taken, the work is more diﬃcult, adding again to
that stress. It is a vicious cycle. Personally, insecurity can give the work a little more edge,
but can also be detrimental after too long a time.
The eﬀect of security (both insecurity and security measures) on choices of leisure
activity was very strong, with almost half of respondents (31) reporting it restricted their
choices ‘a lot’. The most common oﬀ-time activities were catching up with international
friends, including at parties in compounds, and social media contacts with those back
home, rather than local engagements. Fifty-six of the respondents answered that they
spend time with other international friends, while only 26 said they would do so with
local friends. When asked optionally how ‘insecurity and security measures aﬀect you in
your free time’, the sense that someone else held power over respondents’ life via hard
security was prevalent, along with the emotional eﬀects in terms of frustration, lack of
control and a sense of being monitored that this power relation engendered. Among
those giving free-text answers on leisure, 21 gave negative responses, 13 relatively
balanced ones, and only one gave a positive response in terms of no impact: ‘They do
not [aﬀect my leisure time] as I am responsible for security.’
One respondent said:
As we are not allowed to leave our compound for private reasons, we don’t really have spare
time outside of the oﬃce. Therefore it is restricted to reading, watching TV, doing sports in a
small gym or talking, dining and drinking with colleagues. So it has a big impact on your social
contacts and leads to isolation and frustration.
One UN oﬃcer said:
As I live and work in the same compound I ﬁnd it highly stressful and it is actually the only
reason why I need R&R (not the actual security threats). Currently, we are also having ‘com-
pound political’ issues, where security is trying to regulate and limit social life to a bare
minimum through imposing limitations on howmany people can be invited to the compound
and for how long they can stay.
A GovAg worker concurred with the sense of external control and monitoring of one’s
whereabouts:
Most visits to other organizations need special permission from Risk Management and the
superior, who has mostly no security background. This allows the superior to know where
people are going during the free time, where it might just suﬃce that Risk Management is
informed and has given the approval.
As with reinforced workplace security, leisure-time restrictions again added to the nega-
tive consequences for relations with locals. One UN agency worker said, ‘It is impossible to
establish a connection with the local population as a result [of hard security] – this, in turn,
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impacts the quality of the work and the types of interventions we develop.’ An inter-
national NGO consultant said security procedures
can go from not being able to meet my local Afghan friends in the place where I am housed
(because there are only internationals allowed, which feels like an insult) to not being able to
see them outside of the compound due to security restrictions on where I am allowed to go.
This mirrors down to a feeling of isolation paired with sometimes anger (in the case of the
places where nationals aren’t allowed, which feels to me like a segregated apartheid system).
Here the sense of personal frustration dovetailed with concern for locals, with both groups
implicitly seen as the victims of the same system of separation enforced through hard
security.
Another international NGO worker expanded on this theme of power over one’s life
and relationships:
[It is] more the security measures than the actual insecurity that aﬀect my state of mind. I ﬁnd
it patronizing that I need to ask for permission to go to certain places, I ﬁnd it an extreme intru-
sion on my privacy that my Security Manager (and often also the other expats) know exactly
where I am, who I am with, and what I am doing. I very much dislike my guesthouse and I hate
it that I cannot choose myself where I want to live. And ﬁnally, I hate every little part of your life
being monitored.
The sense of surveillance was also present to another international NGO worker:
We are extremely limited as to where we can go, and what we can do. […] Any place that we
could go needed to be approved beforehand so there was very little spontaneity. The most
diﬃcult is that every single part of your life is known by your employer. Hence, many
people snuck around to avoid the associated repercussions of people knowing your
whereabouts.
Another NGO worker, as mentioned, brought up the carceral metaphor: ‘Every time I want
to go somewhere I have to call […] a car [from the organization], they know where I am at
all time, there is a curfew etc. It often feels like being in a golden prison.’
Again, some workers tried to stretch the rules to be able to get on with life and get
something done, or as one UN agency worker said: ‘Because of restricted movement
and transportation, life is limited to speciﬁc places during speciﬁc times, making socia-
lization diﬃcult. I am forced to break these rules (and lie to my employer about where I
am) to have most social interactions.’ Yet in the ‘golden prison’, monitored by powerful
actors in their organization via hard SRM and disconnected from local life while living in
fear of attacks, a sense of purposelessness sometimes set in. While this was often
implicit in the frustration expressed by so many of our respondents in the quotes
above, one worker with an international organization made it explicit: ‘There is no
more free time. We are barely allowed to go out and barely allowed to have friends
over. So we spend most of our free time working or with colleagues, waiting to
leave the country again.’
Inside the golden prison: The politics of bunker life
In extensively reporting our qualitative survey results, we have shown some of the intrica-
cies of security risk management as perceived by international workers themselves, includ-
ing purported mismatches between diﬀerent elements of security provision, as well as
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additional risks generated by hard SRM. In what follows, we concentrate on the political
and psychological/emotional aspects present in the responses above, to draw out some
larger analytical implications concerning the subjective dimensions of bunkerized
intervention.
In the aid world, Duﬃeld (2012) has made intriguing observations about changing aid
worker subjectivities over time, from more idealistic and voluntaristic times to the profes-
sionalized aid careers of today. As he notes, institutional attempts to build a resilient ‘aid
worker self’ have accompanied increased physical bunkering and selective withdrawal
(Duﬃeld 2012; cf. Andersson and Weigand 2015). However, as our survey ﬁndings
show, in the Kabul of 2015–16 the ‘interventionary’ self of our respondents was clearly
not fully socialized into resilient self-responsibilization. They maintained, in short, a
certain distance to the institutional model being imposed upon them (even if this may
yet again be changing with blanket bunkerization in the post-2016 security environment).
In other words, Goﬀman’s framework of a total institution may seem a counterintuitive
or even unhelpful tool for understanding the social dynamics of intervention in Kabul at
this time. However, in focusing on how interveners were gradually institutionalized in a
particular ‘social situation’, and crucially on how they reﬂected on this process themselves,
we may see their particular moment as one of profound change: a move from a relatively
open world of intervention, where the voluntaristic ethos of earlier decades was to some
degree still present, towards a closed and ‘corporate’ model. This was seen clearly when
our key agency, GovAg, eventually moved all its staﬀ from private houses scattered across
Kabul into one single location – the heavily fortiﬁed ‘Green Village’ outside the city.
Halfway towards this total institutionalization, then, many of our respondents were very
well-placed to note its disjunctures and its damaging eﬀects on psyche, sociality, and
the politics of intervention.
If intervention was being institutionalized in Goﬀman’s sense, what kind of total insti-
tution did it resemble? As noted, from an emic viewpoint, the ‘total institution’ alluded to
by our respondents was that of the prison. Following this line, we may indeed wish to
approach the bunkerized living conditions as a ‘carceral space’, a term used broadly to
describe prison-like conditions that reach beyond distinct places of conﬁnement to encom-
pass broader geographies (e.g. Moran 2015). There are some notable similarities between
prisons and bunkerized intervention. First, the physical infrastructure of high walls, surveil-
lance and armed personnel; second, the constant level of monitoring; and third, as Goﬀman
notes as characteristic of total institutions more broadly, the restricted information pertain-
ing to residents’ predicament. In Kabul, closed circuits of information added to the sense of
powerlessness, as ‘security experts’ made ﬁnal decisions on workers’ daily lives based on
intelligence unknown to them. Some of our respondents said they were only confronted
with decisions, not with information, making it diﬃcult for them to make their own judg-
ments – again echoing Goﬀman.Wemay wish to push the prisonmetaphor further and con-
sider how especially the enclosed ‘totalized’ space of a compound worked almost like a
Panopticon, as the intervener ‘is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of information,
never a subject in communication’ (Foucault 1975, 200).
In other words, there are grounds for taking potentially sarcastic remarks such as
‘golden prison’ quite literally, and note the parallels between carceral spaces and
spaces of bunkerized intervention, broadly speaking. Above all, perhaps, the scathing
way in which hard security was denounced indicates how workers found themselves on
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the trajectory towards institutionalization, increasingly seeing themselves as separate from
– and as relatively powerless in relation to – security management.
However, besides these emic and analytical dimensions, the similarities between
prisons and compounds remain rather thin. Those ensconced in fortiﬁed compounds
are after all not inmates, but foreign workers who are often well-paid and are free to
leave their partial conﬁnement at any time. We believe, rather, that another total insti-
tution better reﬂects the kind of institutionalization seen in Kabul: the armed forces. In
an expansion of Goﬀman’s term, Davies (1989) has suggested distinguishing among insti-
tutions based on their purpose, their degree of closure, and their mode of compliance. Bun-
kered interventions are geared towards the performance of a deﬁned external task
(peacebuilding or statebuilding); involve a mix of coercion and normative and remunera-
tive pressure to comply; and have a semi-closed relationship with the outside world. As
such, they seem to replicate to some extent the degree of regimentation, commitment
and enclosure characteristic of the armed forces, in Davies’ typology.
In a follow-up interview, one of our respondents from GovAg brought up the military
metaphor when reﬂecting on the shifting presence of his employer in Kabul, especially
with the move into Green Village. As he noted, living and working in the same space gen-
erated a kind of camaraderie familiar from the armed forces, which some workers resisted
when they were ﬁrst moved into shared compounds, where they sometimes had to
cohabit (and share bathrooms and leisure space with) their bosses. The social arrange-
ments – including the inability to choose where to live and with whom to share a social
context, and the severe restrictions on mobility via curfews, approved destinations and
prescribed forms of transport – indicated a regimented life set behind walls that very
much replicated how NATO soldiers lived out their days in their Kabul compounds, as
he noted.
Academics and practitioners have expended much eﬀort on criticizing the military
appropriation of humanitarianism in Afghanistan and elsewhere, as a ‘force multiplier’
in the war on terror. Coming back to our initial remarks on the scale of analysis of the
Afghan conﬂict, our ‘micro-level’ material suggests that civilian operations in conﬂict
zones may be ‘militarizing’ not just in the overt way of military co-optation; rather, it
suggests that a subtler ‘micro-physics’ of militarization may be ongoing despite surface
attempts to keep aid and military operations apart on a political level. Nor is this militar-
ization simply about the physical surface signs of armed men and bunker walls, but is
rather to be found in the social mechanisms of total institutionalization, that is, in the
very sociopolitical reorganization of daily life in its temporal, intersubjective, and spatial
dimensions.
We must recall that Goﬀman was as interested in the shared elements of diﬀerent kinds
of total institutions, as much as in their diﬀerences: in this vein, we may approach our
Kabul case study as exemplary of the emergence of a distinct form of ‘institutionalized
intervention’, complementing those listed by Davies. Moreover, we must recall
Goﬀman’s ethnographic interest in resistance and collusion, or how ‘inmates’ and other
inhabitants of total institutions engage agonistically with the structure deﬁning their
daily lives – echoing, in turn, the anthropologist James C. Scott’s (1990) concern with
subordinate ‘infrapolitics’ of resistance. However, our ﬁndings indicate that resistance
failed to break through: it remained very much a ‘hidden transcript’, in Scott’s terms,
principally revealed in anonymous survey responses and in informal ﬁeld conversations.
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In this regard, we may note one shared element of prisons, armed forces and aid
bunkers: a ‘dependence on institutional structures’ of the kind traced by Haney (2001)
in his work on subjective adaptation to what he terms ‘prisonization’. This dependence
may in part help explain the curious mismatch between a relatively positive or even-
handed evaluation of security measures upfront in our survey, and the detailed negative
and emotional responses we received further into our questioning. To borrow from Bour-
dieusian sociology, workers who have built their professional lives around aid interven-
tions of the kind practised in ‘high-risk’ countries such as Afghanistan need to cultivate
a certain habitus that allows them to function in their constrained environment. While
this point seconds Duﬃeld’s (2010) observation about shifting forms of aid subjectivity,
from a more idealistic position in earlier decades to a risk-averse aid worker subject
today, our material also complicates the picture. It is clear that, in their often scathing
responses, many workers who learn to cultivate the right, risk-averse ‘aid worker
persona’ for times of militarized risk management are at the same time safeguarding
some spaces of freedom. Psychologically in terms of their critical distance to structures
of power, or practically through stretching of the rules, they ﬁnd ways of drawing on all
resources at their disposal (material, social, spatial and temporal) to preserve a degree
of autonomy, much as inmates do in other total institutions such as the asylums of
Goﬀman’s classic ethnography (1961). This interaction between ‘subjection’ and subver-
sion (De Dardel 2013) reﬂects the complex ‘infrapolitics’ of the bunkered aid world of
Kabul – but also its limits, as attempts to ‘play the system’ repeatedly failed to blossom
into political confrontation and institutional change.
Conclusion: Institutionalization and the rationales of intervention
The politics of international intervention is usually discussed at the overarching national or
international level: the wisdom, say, of the military invasion of Afghanistan; of the ‘surge’,
the drawdown and high-proﬁle aerial attacks; or attempts at building a democratic state
while empowering strongmen and warlords. When the focus of debate shifts to the day-
to-day, small-scale realities of how interventions of diﬀerent kinds are carried out, the poli-
tics is, if not left by the wayside, often de-emphasized relative to the intricacies of social
and material processes of little concern to strategists, IR scholars and international policy-
makers. Yet our respondents in the survey were, directly or indirectly, emphasizing the
politics of their predicament.
We (and our respondents) have not been concerned here with the overall ‘success’ or
‘failure’ of intervention and invasion in Afghanistan. Rather, our focus has been a more
limited one: the contested power dimensions of bunkering up international civilians.
However, as we will suggest in conclusion, this ‘everyday’ perspective may oﬀer an intri-
guing window onto the wider political rationales and realities of intervention.
Our survey results reveal how workers highlighted an intra-institutional ‘bunker poli-
tics’ that lends power over their daily lives to security managers while severely circum-
scribing their work, leisure and personal spaces. Comparing the rational and emotional
reactions to this shift of fortunes among aid workers with ﬁndings from the literature
on total institutions, we then moved on to consider the infrapolitical dimensions of bun-
kered Kabul, whether in their militarized or ‘prisonized’ guise. The ‘protest statements’ as
well as the initially puzzling contrasts in aggregate survey responses, we suggested here,
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hint at the ambivalent position workers face as they see their organizations ‘totalizing’ and
controlling more and more of their daily lives, while contact points with local society, sta-
keholders and beneﬁciaries recede.
In sum, in delineating the conﬂictive nature of depoliticized SRM put in place for
‘workers’ own good’, we have emphasized how an account of ‘bunker politics’ needs
to be accompanied by a deeper analysis of the political and psychological dimensions
of the reorganization of international intervention. Further research is required to gain a
more detailed understanding of these impacts of bunkerization. In particular, the ways
in which local employees of international organizations and ordinary people in conﬂict
zones perceive aid and peace interventions have to be considered, adding important
empirical dimensions to the insider ‘bunker politics’ and psychology set out within this
article.
We may, however, oﬀer a few tentative suggestions for the larger comparative
picture. On an institutional level, the bunkerized ‘archipelago’ (Duﬃeld 2010) may be
seen as serving clear political functions to the wider political project of intervention
in Afghanistan. For individual agencies, as one of our respondents noted in a follow-
up interview, there was often not much choice on whether to ‘stay and deliver’:
some were tied directly to the political goals of ministries in their home countries, as
oﬃcial or semi-oﬃcial development agencies, while others depended ﬁnancially on
the extensive aid funding disbursed in Afghanistan (much as workers beneﬁted from
the comparatively high salaries paid in this ‘high-risk’ setting). For the political paymas-
ters back in Europe and North America, there were strong reasons not to turn back, too.
Our contention is that ‘locking up the kids’ in a ‘golden prison’ where they were left to
‘count the days before leaving’ – to reiterate some striking quotes – served a very useful
political purpose indeed: it indicated a semblance of ‘normality’ and ‘business as usual’,
and it safeguarded decision-makers against accusations that aid worker and soldierly
lives had been lost unnecessarily since the 2001 invasion, as the same interviewee
again noted. As aid money kept ﬂowing; as the EU sought mass deportation deals
with Kabul for migrants arriving into Europe; and as the US escalated its kinetic
approach to the Afghan hinterland, keeping some international civilians bunkered-up
in Kabul ensured some historical ‘continuity’ for powerful Western governments, even
if this continuity was being reduced to window dressing in reality.
Since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan, hard security has often held signiﬁcant sym-
bolic potency for international interveners and local potentates, who may signal their
importance through high-visibility deterrence. In 2016–17, we see yet another, and
much broader, symbolic usage of hard security in the politics of international intervention,
as hard SRM facilitates a token presence in a country left to deal with the dangers ensuing
from seventeen years of the ‘war on terror’, and decades of international military med-
dling, largely on its own. In this aspect, our respondents were also right when they com-
pared their predicament with that of Afghans. Much as such locals were used as token
beneﬁciaries in an aid system operated with little oversight under a strict security
regime, so were international workers useful as token signs of an international presence,
as some of their frustrated responses hinted. Meanwhile, the distance kept growing
between both groups and global centers of power, in a pattern of remote-controlled
and risk-averse international intervention that is being replicated from Kabul to
Bamako, and from Tripoli to Mogadishu and Juba.
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In this troubling context, scholars and policymakers must take seriously insiders’ views of
today’s ‘bunker politics’ in order to arrive at moremeaningful ways of building interventions
to the beneﬁt of conﬂict-torn societies and their inhabitants. One starting point for such a
rethink, we suggest, is to be found in the attempts to break out of the restrictions that
keep proliferating in the thoroughly bunkered-up ‘Kabubble’ – that is, in the infrapolitical
critique and practices of insiders, whose wellbeing and productivity are ostensibly the
goal of the hard security deﬁning their daily existence in the danger zone.
Note
1. All respondents had to answer what type of organization they worked for; mentioning a
speciﬁc one was optional.
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